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INTRODUCTION
The “personal computing” technology paradigm of the last twenty years
has done much to expand the scope of individual agency in the context of law
and policy.  Computers help individuals to create and consume information at
unprecedented scale and at unprecedented speed.  That paradigm has also
tended to suppress equivalent exploration of the possibilities of informal
groups.  This Essay points out some of those possibilities and illustrates how
they may help us understand how and what law does and should regulate,
using some relatively new technologies as points of departure.  I characterize
this as the problem of governance, and I look to groups to frame a solution–
one based less on alternative constructions of conventional public regulation
and more on blends of public and private, and individual and social.1
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of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071 (2005); see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal:
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 342 (2004).
2. Cf. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS  MARKETS AND FREEDOM (forthcoming 2006) (framing the power of the
networked information economy in terms of the enhanced capabilities of individuals). 
3. Recall that the term “computer” was invented to characterize people, not
machines. “Computers” were individuals, often women, who worked in teams to operate
mainframe computers, and before the development of machines for computation, “computers”
were people who computed, that is, who calculated or reckoned.  See PAUL E. CERUZZI, A
HISTORY OF MODERN COMPUTING 1 (1998)
4. Apple Computer memorably captured this sense of liberation in its famous “1984”
television commercial, broadcast during the 1984 Super Bowl, which featured a lone athlete
throwing an enormous hammer and exploding a screen image of a fictional “Big Brother.”
5. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
6. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
7. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
I set aside the premise that computers are particularly liberating for the
individual.   Instead, I offer an alternative premise.  The social dimension of2
computing reminds us that computing is about people, not merely about
information.   Computing builds connections, networks, and pathways for3
information and activity, channels that constrain the individual and that enable
the group.  I argue that we should look for value in the social dimensions of
computing; as matters of law and policy, therefore, we should look for ways
to enhance–and, where appropriate, to limit–that social character.  
Importantly, for law and policy there is little fundamentally different or
unique about the technologies of groups.  Yet, technology serves as an
important element in my re-framing of regulatory focus.  I use the introduction
of the Macintosh computer in 1984 to signify the beginning of true “personal”
computing, that is, a paradigm organized on the assumption that one person
is matched to one machine, “freeing” the individual from the tyranny of
computing’s grey, hierarchical past.   Roughly a decade passed before law and4
public policy began to really absorb the implications of the paradigm,
particularly with regard to the acceptable “use” of that device.  If computing
“freed” the individual, what were the limits of that freedom, and where did
those limits come from?  Intellectual property law offers an example.  In
copyright law, what constitutes an infringing “reproduction” of a copyrighted
computer program?  Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc.,  which5
set the standard for nonliteral reproduction, was decided in 1992.  MAI
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,  which held that a RAM copy of a6
program was sufficiently “fixed” to be infringing, and Sega Enterprises v.
Accolade, Inc.,  which established the legitimacy of reverse engineering for7
producing interoperable computer programs, were both decided in 1993.
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8. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35
F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting copyright claims against Microsoft for infringement of
alleged copyright in desktop metaphor and icons).
9. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
10. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 1-8, 30-42 (1999);
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501,
506 (1999).  That the underlying concern is the relationship between the individual and the
sovereign state is even clearer in James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance,
Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 177-78 (1997).
11. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554-55 (1998).
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International,  analyzing the8
copyrightability of program interfaces, was decided in 1995, and ProCD, Inc.,
v. Zeidenberg,  the first case to give unequivocal endorsement to a shrinkwrap9
license for prepackaged computer software for the PC, was released in 1996.
By the mid-1990s, in short, we could see the basic contours of an intellectual
property jurisprudence of the “personal” computer.
At just about this time, that is, the mid-1990s, the Internet began to
emerge as broad technological phenomenon.  Law and policy analysis turned
to the Internet, but it largely borrowed the individualistic policy framework
that was emerging from the personal computing era.  The mid- and late 1990s
witnessed the introduction of compelling theoretical paradigms that still
govern much of how we think about “cyberspace” law and policy.  As before,
the questions concerned freedom and sovereignty, and specifically how to
conceptualize the relationship of the individual not to the individual machine,
but to the potentially coercive computer network.  Larry Lessig focused on the
physical “architecture” of computer networks as a complement to the
“architecture” of formal law, arguing that the former might be designed to
influence individual behavior in ways that may be inconsistent with formal,
legal norms.   Lessig was both optimistic and pessimistic about the10
possibilities for technological regulation supplanting traditional law.  Joel
Reidenberg, writing around the same time, argued not that technology tells us
something about the limits of law, but that law tells us something about the
limits of technology.   Reidenberg’s point was that values encoded in formal11
law should not be lightly dismissed in the face of technological evolution.
Despite the power of computer networks in transnational contexts, it should
be possible to implement those values in new technical contexts, using the
very malleability of computer technology that prompted Lessig’s concern.
The recent salience of “social software” (a term that I discuss in the next
Part) suggests that the Lessig/Reidenberg model, exploring the relationship
between the individual and the technological sovereign, needs to be
supplemented.  In this first decade of the twenty-first century, we appear to be
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12. Susan Crawford expresses the point as a supplement to the “layers” framework for
conceptualizing the Internet: “Arguably, yet another layer is now evolving that facilitates the
formation of complex social groups based on exchanges of bits and effective use of the
metainformation that is generated by these exchanges,” a layer that might be called the new
“social protocol” layer of the Internet that lies on top of the “application layer” that is at the top
of the current network hierarchy.  Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition
in the Digital Age, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 695, 699 n.12 (2005).  Beth Noveck focuses on the
visual dimension of the phenomenon: “[T]echnology is evolving to be more social and visual
and therefore conducive to collective action by providing the means for collective
visualization.”  Beth Simone Noveck, A Democracy of Groups, 10 FIRST MONDAY, No. 11
(Nov. 7, 2005), http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_11/noveck/index.html; see also
David R. Johnson, How Online Games May Change the Law and Legally Significant
Institutions, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 51 (2004-2005).
13. Informal groups have begun to appear elsewhere in legal scholarship, beyond their
traditional place in theories of social norms and interest groups.  See Robert B. Ahdieh, The
Role of Groups in Norm Transformation: A Dramatic Sketch, In Three Parts, 6 CHI.  J. INT’L
L. 231, 232 (2005) (discussing “clearly defined groups of market participants–committees, task
forces, and the like–both in social ordering generally and in the adoption and evolution of
norms”); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1892 (2005)
(arguing that “property actually serves to facilitate ‘entrance’ into community by tying
individuals into social groups”); see also infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
in the early stages of the development of a new model of computing, one that
explicitly recalls the origins of computing as a social discipline.  Computer
users are using technology collaboratively, explicitly, and in a multiplicity of
ways that we can see for the first time.   Contemporary computing is restoring12
the visibility of social patterns inherent in computer usage.  It facilitates the
creation and maintenance of informal, dynamic groups of people.  As a result,
not only do we need to assess the regulatory significance of these
technologies, but we also face new challenges in appreciating the relationship
between the law and groups themselves. 
Groups are not new to the law, and technology developments aside, this
Essay is more a reminder that we should be attentive to the potential
significance of the informal group rather than a discovery of a novel
phenomenon.   Law has long been happy to recognize groups and their13
benefits, so long as they are suitably formal.  The paradigmatic private group
is the firm, recognized legally as the corporation.  The paradigmatic public
group is the city.  There are groups of other sorts–other business
organizations, unincorporated associations, churches, clubs, and families–all
of which sometimes call for specialized recognition and regulation in law.
“Group” identity, however, is almost always a matter of form.  Corporate
status is granted by the state upon compliance with the corporations code.  In
law, a family begins with a marriage.  Law channels social organization into
prescribed forms, fictionalizing the entity for regulatory purposes.  Absent the
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14. For example, corporate research groups on the topic use a number of different
names.  Microsoft, IBM, and FX Palo Alto Labs each hosts a “Social Computing” group.  See
Social Computing Group Home, http://research.microsoft.com/scg/ (last visited May 18, 2005);
IBM Research: Social Computing Group, http://www.research.ibm.com/ SocialComputing/ (last
visited May 18, 2005); FXPAL - Social Computing, http://www.fxpal.com/?p=socialComputing
(last visited May 18, 2005).  The University of California Berkeley hosts a “Social
Technologies” research group.  See Social Technologies Group, http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/
research/projects/socialtech/ (last visited May 18, 2005).  The best known of the many weblogs
dedicated to the subject is Many to Many which describes its subject matter as social software.
See Corante: Many–to–Many, http://many.corante.com (last visited May 18, 2005).  Some
researchers identify their field as “sociable computing” or “sociable media.”  See Sociable
prescribed form, law looks to the individual.  Informal social structures are
messy and dynamic; formal legal structures are relatively neat, and static.  Part
of my argument here is that something is lost in the translation.  There may be
good which comes from informal groups, good that which may be lost when
group activity is channeled into typical legal forms.
From the technology side, then, the questions no longer consist only of
the implicitly individualistic “What does technology tell us about how law
regulates?,” “What does law tells us about how technology regulates?,” and
the comparably pragmatic, “How do we get individuals to do what we want
and to stop what we don’t?”  There is a new question, which is this: “What
should the combination of technology and law tell us about what is, and
should be, regulated?”  It seems to me that computing technology is bringing
informal groups to the fore.
The balance of this Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I briefly describes
some of these newer technologies.  Part II points out some provocative theory
and research–some within law and some without–that suggests that
recognizing informal groups may serve the law well for reasons and in
contexts that have little to do with technology.  Part III illustrates how the
approaches described in Part II are already implicitly recognized in the law,
at least in part.  As an example, this Part suggests that some difficult
contemporary legal issues surrounding computer technology may be best
understood as problems of trying to identify informal groups and their patterns
of social behavior, rather than as problems of regulating individual behavior.
This Part also suggests some ways in which the law might try to regulate
group formation by regulating ways to heighten, or lessen, group salience.
I.  SOCIAL SOFTWARE AND GROUP SALIENCE
I use the term “social software” somewhat loosely, certainly more
loosely than the term and its cousins–“social computing,” “social
technologies,” and “social media”–are used by technologists themselves.14
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Media Group–MIT Media Lab, http://smg.media.mit.edu/ (last visited May 20, 2005) (exploring
questions of identity and society in the context of computer networks).   “Social media,” which
is used (among other places) in the title of American University’s Center for Social Media,
embraces uses of “traditional” media, including television and film, for collaborative and civic
purposes.
15. On the relationship between sociocultural behavior, and stable patterns of
information distribution and use, see BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES:
REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 44-45 (1991) (noting that print
technology, as standardized, fixed, and authoritative, enables the rise of “imagined” or “virtual”
communities, as compared to “real” communities); DAVID S. KAUFER & KATHLEEN M. CARLEY,
COMMUNICATION AT A DISTANCE:  THE INFLUENCE OF PRINT ON SOCIOCULTURAL ORGANIZATION
AND CHANGE 205-50 (1993) (The authors describe a “constructuralist” model of sociocognitive
behavior, link individual agency with dynamic properties of groups, and argue that the shape
and pace of the information exchange is influenced by the character of the communication
technology used.  Print, in particular, affects the diffusion, stability, and consensus-related
dimensions of information.).
Technologists often use “social software” specifically to describe a class of
computer programs, environments, tools, and protocols that are designed to
enhance individual productivity or sociability in group settings on the Internet
or other computer networks.  I borrow the term in order to capture two more
general phenomena.  The first is the fact that some computer programs are
designed to enable the interaction of individuals with one another, particularly
as parts of both pre-existing and new groups, small and large.  The key feature
here is the dynamism of group affiliation.  Informal groups are stable, but not
static.  Individuals come and go, altering the group in some sense and
possibly, though not necessarily, changing it to such an extent that the group
dissolves, or becomes a different group.    
The second, which is related to the first, is the fact that many of these
technologies allow us to “see” the contours of both the interaction and the
group itself.  “Seeing” has a couple of dimensions.  In part it means that the
dynamic character of the group is visible.  In part it means that the stability or
permanence of the group is visible.  “Seeing” the contours of the interaction
and of the group means, in other words, that these systems typically are not
simply about creating and exchanging data, whether that data is “information”
or creative “content” or something else.  They are about creating and
exchanging data connected to social identity.  There is a relative permanence
to these relationships; the data “belongs” to someone, in an intuitive if not
formal or legal sense, and that data identity is related to other identities in the
system in ways that are generally persistent over time.  
Social software, in short, is technology that embodies evolving social
patterns–meeting, communicating, and processing and sharing information
across communities, groups, and other collectives.   It heightens the salience15
of informal, stable online groups.  In many cases, user-interface design and
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16. The Science, Technology & Society research community would note that social
software is not itself a class of technologies; social software is about particular socio-technical
domains.  That argument is certainly consistent with mine.  Here, I simplify in order to make
the initial discussion clearer. 
17. On the importance of “weak ties” in social networks, see Mark Granovetter, The
Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOC. THEORY 201 (1983); Gabriel
Weimann, The Strength of Weak Conversational Ties in the Flow of Information and Influence,
5 SOC. NETWORKS 245 (1983).  On the benefits of salience for group activity, and how salience
can be enhanced via technical design, see, for example, Thomas Erickson & Wendy A. Kellogg,
Social Translucence: An Approach to Designing Systems that Support Social Processes, in 7
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-HUMAN INTERACTION 59 (2000) (describing digital
systems that support coherent but fluid group behavior by making participants and their
activities visible to one another; such systems are characterized by visibility, awareness, and
accountability, which enable people to draw on their social experience and expertise to structure
their interactions).  Salience and visibility enhance understanding.  “All communication between
the readers of an image and the makers of an image must now take place on a two-dimensional
surface.  Escaping this flatland is the essential task of envisioning information–for all the
interesting worlds (physical, biological, imaginary, human) that we seek to understand are
inevitably and happily multivariate in nature.”  EDWARD R. TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION
12 (1990) (emphasis in original).  To the extent that a sense of connectedness reinforces
connections themselves, salience and visibility may enhance the formation and persistence of
groups.  See Brian S. Butler, Membership Size, Communication Activity, and Sustainability: A
Resource-Based Model of Online Social Structures, 12 INFO. SYS. RES. 346 (2001) (arguing that
salience may enhance the perceived benefits of groups, including opportunities for affiliation
or companionship, opportunities to influence people, social support, access to information, the
ability to disseminate ideas rapidly, and support for collective action).  Social networking
researchers note that people vary widely in their ability to intuit the existence, scale, and
functioning of social networks.  See Daniele Bondonio, Predictors of Accuracy in Perceiving
Informal Social Networks, 20 SOC. NETWORKS 301 (1998); Ece Kumbasar et al., Systematic
Biases in Social Perception, 100 AM. J.  SOC. 477 (1994).
other user-accessible features of these technologies enable individuals literally
to observe the actions of others using the same technology, synchronously or
asynchronously.   (Users of the technology may see those relationships, or16
observers of the use may do so, and in some cases both do.)  In others, the
salience of the group itself is indirect but is apparent via artifacts that reify the
group, wholly or partially.  The sum of it is that “social software” supports the
formation of dynamic social relationships customized by the individuals who
create and perpetuate them, and it makes social groups visible via their activity
in, on, and using a computer network.   Some examples, focused particularly17
on technologies that have been the focus of debates about law and public
policy, make this description more concrete:
Peer-to-Peer Technologies.  Peer-to-peer or “P2P” technologies came
to popular attention via litigation over the original Napster music-sharing
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18. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
19. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub
nom. Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
20. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
21. See Groove Virtual Office, http://www.groove.net (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
22. Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE
L.J. 369, 375 (2002).
service,  and its successors, including Aimster  and Grokster.   These18 19 20
programs and their P2P cousins share a basic network architecture that makes
each client computer a potential network peer, able to upload content to other
client computers as well as to download content from them.  Users on a P2P
network can search inventories of material on other users’ computers, and can
deliver and retrieve material directly to and from other users, without
necessarily relying on access to a central data server.  Whether authorized or
unauthorized, a peer-to-peer network creates and supports a form of group
interaction using the Internet that is distinguishable from what has become the
conventional server-client form of distribution of digital content.  P2P
networks need not be driven by interests in music or movies, a point that is
illustrated by the success of the Groove Networks commercial P2P platform
for office productivity.21
Open Source Software.  “Open source” computer programs, sometimes
known as “Free/Open Source Software” or F/OSS, are distinguished legally
by their distribution under software license regimes that mandate user access
to the source code of the programs.  The licenses give users a power to modify
and adapt programs that is otherwise all but forbidden, as a technological and
legal matter, when programs are distributed only in object code format.  In
most instances, F/OSS licenses authorize users to redistribute their
modifications so long as they do so using comparable “open source” licensing
terms.  I regard open source as a form of social software not merely because
of the licensing regime that supports it, but because the license regime
implements and confirms the notion that development of an “open source”
program is meant to be a continuing, collaborative process distributed across
time, space, and environment, rather than a “product” that emerges as a
“thing” from an integrated firm.  Echoing its social dimension, Yochai
Benkler describes open source as a prime example of “[c]ommons-based peer
production.”22
Weblogs.  It is virtually impossible to define “weblog”; the term has
become jargon for a collection of technologies and styles of posting material
to websites that are formatted chronologically, like diaries.  Blogs may be
academic or intellectual; they may be political; they may be intensely
personal.  What makes blogs social is not their content, but the variety of
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23. See Technorati: Home, http://www.technorati.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
24. See Bloglines, http://www.bloglines.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
25. See Front Page, http://c2.com/cgi/wiki (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
26. See Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
27. See Slashdot: News for Nerds,  Stuff That Matters, http://www.slashdot.org (last
visited Feb. 14, 2005).
28. See Slashcode: Slash Open Source Project, http://www.slashcode.com  (last visited
Feb. 14, 2005).
technologies that exist to enable readers and writers to communicate with one
another about their content.  Blog content may be distributed to readers via
“syndication” technology that reformats blog content and delivers it
electronically to aggregators and news readers used by readers.  Blog authors
may post lists of links to other blogs, suggesting a constellation of blogs of
possible interest to readers with certain interests.  Bloggers may enable
readers to post comments on blog posts.  “Trackback” technology, which
marks instances in which blogs discuss posts at other blogs, allows bloggers
and readers alike to watch posters, readers, and other blogs respond to one
another.  Third-party services such as Technorati  and Bloglines  offer23 24
technological facilities to bloggers and readers that allow both to see the web
of links that extends to and from a blog.  The simplicity of blogging
technologies has led not only to their rapid integration into the World Wide
Web itself but to their combination with other computer networking
developments:  “Moblogging,” for example, describes the integration of blog
technology and mobile networking.  Bloggers can post blog content, including
sound, video, and still images, as well as text, from mobile devices.
Collaborative Authoring Technologies.  Though weblog technologies
enable groups of authors to post to single weblogs, two of the best-known
forms of collaborative authoring technologies are wikis and slashdot.  When
implemented as a website, a wiki allows any visitor to post content, edit
content, or delete content.  The collaborative writing and editing process
likewise extends to the structure of the material that resides on the wiki.  (The
term sometimes also refers to the computer program that supports this sort of
forum.)   The most celebrated and robust implementation of a wiki is the25
Wikipedia,  a sort of online encyclopedia that consists of content contributed26
to and edited by the user population itself.  The quality of Wikipedia content
appears to vary, depending on the depth and level of engagement of the
relevant user population.  This level of engagement is precisely what prompts
characterization of the wiki idea as a form of social software, since the
software creates usable output only to the extent that the output is sustained
by a population of users that is willing to police the wiki.  Slashdot  is the27
best-known implementation of the Slash technology.   While the content of28
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29. By listing examples here, I run a clear risk regarding both timeliness and hipness,
or lack of both.  Some of the better known personal social networking sites include Meetup,
Inc., http://www.meetup.com; Friendster, http://www.friendster.com; Orkut,
https://www.orkut.com; MySpace.com, http://www.myspace.com; Tribe Networks,
http://www.tribe.net; LinkedIn, http://www.linkedin.com; craigslist, http://www.craigslist.org;
and Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (all last visited May 20, 2005).  Social networking
sites oriented to commercial sales and marketing professionals include Ryze,
http://www.ryze.com;  Spoke, http://www.spoke.com; and Socialtext, http://www.socialtext.com
(all last visited May 20, 2005). 
the site is technology news, it is neither a weblog (as that term has come to be
used) or a wiki, but it shares some attributes of both.  Slashdot is a Web-based
forum for news and information about computer technology.  Like a blog,
content to the slashdot.org website is posted sequentially and chronologically.
Like a wiki, anyone can post new material and can comment on existing
material.  Unlike either, however, the Slash technology includes a “polling”
feature that enables regular visitors to the site effectively to “rate” postings by
other visitors, and effectively to drive low-rated postings, and posters, from
the site.  A small group of moderators retains editorial discretion over the site
as a whole, giving the entire setup the feel of a managed community.
Social Networking Software.  The term “social networking software”
encompasses an ever-expanding list of Web-based computer technologies,
many oriented to one or more commercial markets, that are designed to help
individuals and businesses share information about one another, and possibly
to meet one another and develop and nurture relationships.   The relationships
may remain entirely virtual and “informational,” or they may transition into
“real space.”  They may remain one-to-one, or they may be part of community
or group building.  They may be based on finding others with shared political,
intellectual, or social interests.  They may be little more than online dating
services.  Or they may offer ways for companies and individuals in business
to develop business partners or customer or supply networks.29
Virtual Worlds.  Among the earliest forms of social software were multi-
player online games, sometimes known as virtual reality systems or virtual
worlds.  Some of these are now so large and complex that they are referred to
by the acronym MMORPG (Massive Multi-player Online Role Playing
Games).  More broadly and generally, they may be referred to by the more
humble acronym, MMOG (Massive Multi-player Online Games), to
encompass online virtual worlds that do not involve role playing by
participants.  Earlier versions, still available in some corners of the Internet,
are related spaces called MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons, or Multi-User
Domains, which are text-based multi-player environments) and MOOs (MUD
Object-Oriented, or multi-player environments that combine text-based
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30. The legal implications of the embodied self have received a lot of recent attention.
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin,  Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 68-71
(2004-2005) (exploring the limits of the “right to design” and the “right to play”); Susan P.
Crawford, Who’s in Charge of Who I Am?: Identity and Law Online, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
211, 213-15 (2004-2005) (describing the online identities of avatars as an emergent, group
process); David R. Johnson, How Online Games May Change the Law and Legally Significant
Institutions, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 51, 52 (2004-2005) (describing the variety and flexibility
of avatar roles); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL.
L.  REV. 1,  10-11 (2004) (describing the intersections between real and virtual avatar presences).
31. See Feedback Forum, http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html (last
visited Feb. 14,  2005).
32. “Social tagging” websites include del.icio.us, http://del.icio.us, and flikr.com,
http://flikr.com (both last visited May 20, 2005).  
33. See Tim Berners-Lee et al., The Semantic Web, 284 SCI.  AM. 34 (2001).
interaction with multimedia sound and visual features).  Using any of these
technologies, individuals log in to the game environment and adopt a “role,”
known to gamers as an “avatar,”  either themselves or an inhabited character,30
in which to engage other players.  The point may be to build and inhabit a
community, or to accumulate wealth, or to do any of an enormous variety of
things, many of which track “real life” activities.  To an increasing extent,
MMORPGs are developed and managed by entertainment companies that
develop and distribute the software that individuals use to access the game
environment, and that host and manage the computer servers that run the
software that creates that environment.
Social Tagging Technologies.  An intuitive inventory of computer
software that supports social interactions may not include online auctioneers
and booksellers, but eBay and Amazon.com have succeeded as electronic
commerce ventures in part precisely because of social mechanisms built into
their businesses.  eBay offers its users the ability to deliver online ratings to
buyers and sellers, allowing all who use eBay’s facilities the ability to judge
the trustworthiness of their potential business partners.   Amazon.com does31
something similar by offering anyone who visits its site the ability to post
reviews of its products.  Features of eBay and Amazon.com may be
characterized as species of social tagging systems, in which members of the
group use group tools to label, rate, or otherwise give meaning to actions by
other individuals or entities in the group.   From a technical standpoint,32
another example is the Semantic Web,  an effort to develop a means to33
“code” content on websites so that computers can interpret the meaning of that
content, rather than merely render a display of the underlying HTML coding.
This, of course, is a sort of machine sociability, but it reflects the sensibility
that there is more to a computer network than an individual’s interaction with
a computer.  A more provocative example is the Microsoft Research project
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34. See Marc A. Smith et al., Object AURAs: A Mobile Retail and Product Annotation
System, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 240, 240-
41 (2004); MSR AURA Portal–Annotate the Planet!, http://aura.research.microsoft.com (last
visited Feb. 14, 2005).
35. A small sampling of this literature includes ROBERT M.  AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION (1984); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE
INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE, VOL. 1 (2d ed. 2000); ERVING
GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); EDWARD T. HALL, THE
HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SILENCE
OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003); WILLIAM H. WHYTE, CITY: REDISCOVERING THE CENTER (1988);
Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Social Capital and Community Governance, 112 ECON. J.
F419 (2002).
36. See, e.g.,  J. L. MORENO, WHO SHALL SURVIVE? A NEW APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
OF HUMAN INTERRELATIONS (1934).  An interesting intellectual history of the field is LINTON
C. FREEMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS : A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY
OF SCIENCE (2004).
named Aura,  which enables owners of mobile digital network devices (such34
as PDAs) to “annotate” everyday objects by scanning their UPC bar codes and
entering new data about the objects into a distinct database.  Anyone with a
UPC bar-code scanner may scan the object and access the contents of the
database.  As with the wiki concept, anyone may upload new information
about that object; the data is contributed to what amounts to a wikipedia for
things.  The object “becomes” its construction via engagement by users and
consumers, rather than existing only as the UPC value declared by its
manufacturer.  And information about the thing becomes potentially widely
distributed, rather than being concentrated in the thing itself.  
My inventory does not exhaust the possibilities.  Grid computing, e-mail
lists, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), podcasting, instant messaging technologies,
and even Google’s PageRank algorithm each could be characterized similarly
as social software, that is, as a tool for engaging in and tracking individual
contributions to collaborative, collective, or group activity, through salient or
visible features of the technology.  The next question is whether, and why, law
and policy should care about these things.  
II.  THE VIRTUES OF INFORMAL GROUPS
I do not want to overstate the novelty of this project.  Sociologists and
other social scientists have been studying informal groups for a century,  and35
the dynamics of informal “social networks” have themselves been the objects
of scholarly attention for nearly that long.   All of the Internet is social36
software, in an abstract sense.  From the beginning, informal groups have been
the very point of computer networking.  J.C.R. Licklider, known by some as
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37. See J.C.R. Licklider & Robert W. Taylor, The Computer as a Communication
Device, SCI. & TECH., Apr. 1968, at 76, 77-78, available at http://gatekeeper.dec.com/
pub/DEC/SRC/publications/taylor/licklider-taylor.pdf:
When people communicate face to face, they externalize their models so they can
be sure they are talking about the same thing.  Even such a simple externalized model
as a flow diagram or an outline–because it can be seen by all the communicators–
serves as a focus for discussion. It changes the nature of communication: When
communicators have no such common framework, they merely make speeches at each
other; but when they have a manipulable model before them, they utter a few words,
point, sketch, nod, or object. 
The dynamics of such communication are so model-centered as to suggest an
important conclusion: Perhaps the reason present-day two-way telecommunication
falls so far short of face-to-face communication is simply that it fails to provide
facilities for externalizing models.
This model of the network fits hand-in-glove with Licklider’s earlier concept of “man-computer
symbiosis”:  “The hope is that, in not too many years, human brains and computing machines
will be coupled together very tightly, and that the resulting partnership will think as no human
brain has ever thought and process data in a way not approached by the information-handling
machines we know today.”  J.C.R. Licklider, Man-Computer Symbiosis, HFE-1 IRE
TRANSACTIONS  HUM. FACTORS ELECS. 4, 5 (1960).
38. The sorts of questions that sociologists would ask about social software might
include: How do these groups get formed, and how do they decay?  What is the value in
computing–does it lie in the creation, in the distribution, in the exchange, and/or in sociability
itself?  How do these tools reflect and change how we interact with other people?  How do
people create value in a group?  How do members present themselves to each other and to
outsiders?  Are these really “groups” in a sociological sense, or are they communities, or
associations?  What are the boundaries of the group, and what are its power dynamics?  Why
do people behave in certain ways in groups?  Cooperate?  Defect?  How do they create trust, or
authenticity, or betray it?  How and why do they manage the resources of the group?
39. The tradition that links social capital and associational activity to political and
economic well-being runs from Alexis de Tocqueville through Robert Putnam.  See ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000);
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993).
the father of the Internet, wrote that computer networking had the potential to
make visible models of cooperative behavior that made human communication
possible.37
What is different now, then, about the diverse cluster of computing
applications that I inventoried in the last Part?  At one level, the answer, I
think, is nothing.  Informal groups are informal groups, whether they are
online, or offline, or both.  Sociologists and other social scientists do know
quite a bit about groups: what constitutes a group, how and why a group
forms, and how a group operates.   There is a long and deep tradition of38
respecting informal groups in American society and polity,  and there is little39
reason to think that Internet-enabled groups are any more or less
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40. That skepticism is most pronounced in conventional accounts of democratic
processes, from Madison’s effort to defend the Constitution as a mechanism for limiting faction,
see THE FEDERALIST No. 10, to Cass Sunstein’s recent skeptical analysis of the Internet, see
generally CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).   For a critical view of Sunstein’s argument,
and one more sympathetic to the role of groups generally and online in particular, see Dan
Hunter, Philippic.com, 90 CAL. L. REV. 611 (2002).
41. See supra notes 10-11 (describing Lessig/Reidenberg models of cyberspace law).
A useful synthesis of the struggle appears in Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989). 
42. See Beth S. Noveck & David R. Johnson, Society’s Software, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
469, 472-73 (2005).
43. Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004).  
44. See id. at 278 & n.5.
45. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING
ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (2000).
46. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION
comprehensible, or socially valuable, than groups that are not enabled by the
Internet.
The law, on the other hand, has long been skeptical of informal groups.40
The legal system does not know much about how to interrogate them, and
despite a lot of sustained effort, has never really succeeded in reconciling the
notion of the group with the authority of the state.   Part of the skepticism41
may be based on held-over Enlightenment philosophy; part of it may be
suspicion of entities that are difficult to define with precision.   The law42
regulates individuals, or the law channels group behavior into a regulable
form, i.e., the firm.  The power of this dualism is evident, for example, in
Yochai Benkler’s recent article exploring social sharing as a modality of
economic production.   Benkler’s work consists of a thorough investigation43
of the characteristics of the goods that lend themselves to production via a
social sharing model, using open source computer software as his principal
example.  The oppositions that he sets up are social sharing versus markets
(i.e., individual exchange), and social sharing versus hierarchies (i.e., firms).
Social sharing appears to be a function of informal groups mediated by certain
material conditions, yet Benkler is mostly unconcerned with the dynamics of
the groups themselves.  He traces his analysis to the bedrock assumption that
social sharing may be a superior method of supporting individual agency in
the production process.   The question is the circumstances under which that44
is true.
Yet if popular writing is any guide, then there is something to the sense
that Internet technologies make forming and preserving informal groups online
somewhat easier than doing so offline.  Howard Rheingold followed his The
Virtual Community in 2000  with Smart Mobs in 2002.   Lior Strahilevitz is45 46
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MARY L. REV. 951 (2004) (article discussing this issue).
49. See Noveck, supra note 12.  Other examples of recent legal scholarship that might
be characterized as investigations of group agency include: Crawford, supra note 12; Jonathan
Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2006) (on file with
author); Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 534 (2003).
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NATIONS (2004).
51. See PHILIP BALL, CRITICAL MASS: HOW ONE THING LEADS TO ANOTHER (2004).
52. See David McGowan, From Social Friction to Social Meaning: What Expressive
Uses of Code Tell Us About Free Speech, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1515, 1516 (2003); Miranda Oshige
McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevitable Normativity of
Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312, 1312-15  (2004); Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the
Bad and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949, 949-53
(2004).
working through applications of network theory to privacy and file-sharing,
among other things;  Dan Hunter and Greg Lastowka are pursuing the47
economic implications of empowering groups of individuals in online
networks;  and Beth Noveck is developing a theory of groups as democratic48
actors.   The sense that we should give informal groups another look has49
carried over into analyses of offline behavior as well.  On the popular side,
James Surowiecki published The Wisdom of Crowds in 2004,  distilling50
economic and social networking research into the simple thesis that large,
diverse, decentralized, and loosely affiliated groups of people can be effective
at solving problems and finding answers.  Philip Ball’s Critical Mass recently
presented a comparable argument by using principles of physical science to
analyze social phenomena.  Legal scholars are reexamining group51
sensibilities in offline contexts.52
I suspect that a couple of things are going on.  One is obviously
technological.  Social software is taking the promise that Licklider saw–a
promise based, of course, on our deep-seated associational traditions–and is
realizing it in ways both real and visible.  A second is the confluence of that
technological development with literature in sociology and economics.
Economists, at least since Hayek, have understood the value of markets–i.e.,
large groups of people–in aggregating diverse, distributed information.
Sociologists have long sensed the existence of informal groups but have had
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53. One outstanding example of how information policy might build on salient features
of institutional settings is JOHN SEELY BROWN & PAUL DUGUID, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF
INFORMATION 207-41 (2000), which discusses the issue in depth.
54. On the social dimensions of P2P systems, see Eytan Adar & Bernardo A.
Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, 5 FIRST MONDAY, No. 10 (Oct. 2, 2000), http://
www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_10/adar/index.html.  Hunter and Lastowka offer an
economic account of P2P file-sharing that focuses on group dynamics first.  See Hunter &
Lastowka, supra note 48, at 951.  As for casual carpooling, the “goods”-based account predicts
that the system would arise concurrently with the material conditions that define it: carpool
lanes on the highway and spare seats in the cars.  But casual carpooling in the Bay Area did not
arise for more than ten years after carpool lanes were installed on the San Francisco-Oakland
Bay Bridge.  Toll reductions for carpools were implemented in 1971.  See The San
Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge, http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/esc/tollbridge/SFOBB/
Sfobbfacts.html (last visited May 20, 2005).  Casual carpooling has been in existence only since
the late 1980s.  See What are Casual Carpools?, http://www.ridenow.org/carpool/what.htm (last
visited May 20, 2005) (describing the system as having been in existence “for more than 20
years”).  It really took off only as groups of carpoolers and drivers were able to literally see one
another.  For years, casual carpooling depended entirely on word of mouth and, more broadly
and deeply, on the observations of people who drove alone into San Francisco, bypassing the
lines of waiting carpoolers and then being passed by them while waiting to pay the tolls.  The
local public transit system initially objected to this use of “its” sidewalk space at first, but the
carpooling system grew popular enough that cities installed signs adjacent to bus stops,
directing casual carpoolers to stand in certain places.  Newspaper publishers added sidewalk
newspaper boxes.  Sometimes lines of people would wait for cars; sometimes lines of cars would
wait for people.  The point is that casual carpooling did not gain a foothold as an economic
system of empty seats; it gained a foothold as an informal dynamic group based on visible
material conditions and a set of informal norms about locations and driver/rider behavior.    The
visibility of the system helped create a virtuous circle.  I was a casual carpool system user for
several years in the San Francisco Bay Area and participated in the early development of this
“sharing” mechanism.
difficulty (or have not been concerned with) articulating their normative value,
aside from the purposive goals of some of them.  As those groups become
more salient, we see the urge to explore whether informal groups could be
good for something, even if we do not know as much as we would like about
how they work.  Something more important than block parties, more specific
than pricing, and more tangible than civic republicanism.   Benkler’s account53
of “social sharing” fits this premise, even if his account of open source
software production as an example of “social sharing” is built around the
characteristics of inputs and outputs, rather than around the characteristics of
the open source programmer community.   He uses other examples to round
out the model, but neither of them–distributed computing, nor “casual”
carpooling traditions in the San Francisco Bay Area and Northern
Virginia–can be explained fully without an account of the groups that support
them.   The Internet preceded SETI@home; the interstate highway system54
preceded casual carpooling.  If these three phenomena are all truly examples
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GROUPS (1965); see also Noveck & Johnson, supra note 42, at 469-70 (describing significance
of groups in First Amendment context). 
57. See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory
of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 752 (2003).  In a recent paper, Froomkin makes a more
concrete argument about the need for government to encourage informal, self-governing groups
and institutions.  See A. Michael Froomkin, Building the Bottom Up From the Top Down
(Working Paper 2006) (on file with author).  The paper offers a series of eight steps that the
government could take to promote formation of groups.
of “social sharing,” then it may be sounder to characterize their positive
welfare effects as by-products of groups.  If informal groups are valuable,
even–or especially–if that is true for reasons that we have difficulty
articulating, then the law should pay attention.  The salience of informal
groups, particularly in technological context, means that the law should revisit
its long standing reluctance to acknowledge them as a regulatory matter.
The remainder of this Part describes, briefly, three examples of what
might be called “middle range” normative accounts of informal groups,
accounts that are broad enough to be interesting and potentially useful as
policy matters, but not so broad that they swallow law or policy as an entire
domain.
A.  Lawmaking Groups
The logical place to start considering the value of groups is democratic
theory and the argument for pluralism in law and politics.  Beth Noveck’s
recent work argues precisely this point, that “technology is revolutionizing our
capacity for purposive collective action with geographically remote actors,”55
and that informal collectives relying on social technologies can take their
rightful place as legitimate institutions as such in political theory, capable of
being recognized as more than simply mechanisms for transmitting individual
interests.    Somewhat similarly, Michael Froomkin has argued that, by virtue56
of particular technological and social conditions, certain informal groups
involved in setting technical standards for the Internet may satisfy the rigorous
conditions required to establish a Habermasian discourse and thereby
demonstrate the legitimacy of their governing.57
An even richer and more provocative suggestion regarding the role of
groups in law comes from the work of Robert Cover.  Cover argued that the
very meaning of law arises naturally from collectives of people, what Cover
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58. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
59. Id. at 31.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id. at 68.
62. A recent effort to formalize Cover’s theory calls these “nomic groups.”  See
Franklin G. Snyder, Nomos, Narrative, and Adjudication: Toward a Jurisgenetic Theory of
Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1623, 1625 (1999).  Importantly, of course, Cover distinguished
between groups sanctioned by the state and those that exist autonomously.  More recent
commentators have argued that Cover’s work challenges us to explore connections between the
state and groups, rather than to preserve distance between them.  See Judith Resnik, Living Their
Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
17, 26 (2005) (“I read Cover as endlessly fascinated with the interactions between the state and
paideic communities–and with the potential for such interactions themselves to be
jurisgenerative moments.”). 
63. Cover, supra note 58, at 12-13.  Cover characterizes this as a “paideic” pattern of
community formation, contrasting it with an “imperial” pattern of norms, objectively defined
and subscribed to.
called interpretive communities, rather than being developed and imposed via
a sovereign.   Each interpretive community constitutes a distinct nomos, or58
normative universe, “an integrated world of obligation and reality from which
the rest of the world is perceived.”   An interpretive community is defined by59
its narrative: “Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in
discourse–to be supplied with history and destiny, beginning and end,
explanation and purpose.  And every narrative is insistent in its demand for its
prescriptive point, its moral.”   Amid a multiplicity of interpretive60
communities, the role of the state is purely coercive, by asserting and then
enforcing a superior right to interpretation.  
The optimistic view of Cover’s argument, which is what I borrow here,
relies on his conclusion: “Legal meaning is a challenging enrichment of social
life, a potential restraint on arbitrary power and violence.  We ought to stop
circumscribing the nomos; we ought to invite new worlds.”   In concrete61
terms, though Cover framed his argument primarily in terms of the narratives
that define interpretive communities, he invited law to recognize the
legitimacy of the lawmaking function of informal groups.   62
Not all collectives generate the meanings that Cover suggested be
recognized.  It is not that there are good groups and bad groups.  Groups exist,
or do not.  Interpretive communities, he proposed, share three characteristics:
“[(1)] a common body of precept and narrative, (2) a common and personal
way of being educated into this corpus, and (3) a sense of direction or growth
that is constituted as the individual and his community work out the
implications of their law.”63
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65. Some recent work on electronic commerce and intellectual property licensing
suggests that the law take precisely this direction.  See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, From Medieval
Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation
(Working Paper 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661543 (relying in part on the
virtues of medieval business collectives); Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software
License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 338-39 (2003).   My  article points out that focusing on the
social benefits of salience may be a point of entry for justifying the open source license as a
legitimate governance mechanism.  See generally Reidenberg, supra note 11 (article
emphasizing the virtues of governance by private collectives, using examples from medieval
business practice); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (same).  I draw out these
examples because Cover’s sensibility echoes a pre-Enlightenment social ethos that focuses on
relationships among social groups of different sizes and types, rather than on the relationship
between the state and the individual.  See Snyder, supra note 62, at 1636-42 (summarizing work
on Cover that emphasizes this aspect of his theory).  Nomos and narrative, informal groups, and
software licensing are thus more closely related than they might initially appear.
Call these elements the narrative, the social structure, and the set of shared
commitments among group members and between group members and the
group which as a whole define the community.  The group is dynamic; it
learns, and it grows, with reference to both its content and its membership:
Law as Torah is pedagogic.  It requires both the discipline of study and the projection
of understanding onto the future that is interpretation. Obedience is correlative to
understanding. Discourse is initiatory, celebratory, expressive, and performative,
rather than critical and analytic. Interpersonal commitments are characterized by
reciprocal acknowledgment, the recognition that individuals have particular needs and
strong obligations to render person-specific responses.64
In the right time, then, and given the right conditions, informal groups of a
variety of sorts justify what Cover might have called “nomic” treatment.  Less
formally, the existence of an informal group might itself justify some
heightened degree of deference to the internal normative commitments of that
group.   Note, of course, that the existence of “nomic” groups remains to be65
demonstrated, rather than assumed, and the conclusion that legal meaning both
does and should grow out of these groups is controversial.  But Cover’s work
offers an initial hook for thinking provocatively about what good groups might
do. 
B.  Cognitive Groups
A second point of departure, though one that is no less provocative, is
the work of some scholars of cognitive social science.  The question here goes
to learning and adaptability, and to innovation and creativity, which lie at the
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heart of contemporary debates about patent and copyright policy and about
free speech, innovation, and information policy generally.   
The classic model of human cognitive processing is that of the individual
mind, processing formal symbolic representations of the world.  In most
research on the cognitive dimensions of “creativity,” for example, researchers
focus on the attributes of the “creative” individual.   In recent years, however,66
an alternative model has begun to emerge, one that describes cognition, and
the cognitive dimensions of learning and adaptation, in sociocultural terms.
Cognition is a group activity, not purely an individual one.
Among the best-known pieces of research that illustrates the point is
Edwin Hutchins’s Cognition in the Wild.   Hutchins, an anthropologist at the67
University of California San Diego, set out to study how sailors navigate.  He
sailed with several American naval vessels, including two aircraft carriers and
two amphibious ships, to observe how naval personnel handled their
responsibilities on the navigation bridge of each one.  One of the latter, the
Palau, frames most of the data and analysis in his book.
Hutchins’s core finding is that the problem-solving (i.e., cognitive)
capabilities of the crew of the navigation bridge exceed the problem-solving
capabilities of the individual.   He draws two sorts of distinctions, both based68
on the material conditions that he observed on the bridge.  One distinction is
based on the various technological tools that individuals relied on (for
communication and for computation, for example); a second distinction was
based on the social organization of the crew.  Communication both reflected
a particular social order and created it:
The social structure is not only the framework on which the communication is
based, it is also the mechanism that is in place prior to the interactions to ensure that
they take place as required.  Why should the pelorus operator cooperate?  Because
adequate performance is the currency of social interaction.  The novice quartermaster
is institutionally located in such a way that his actions can be taken both as
contributions to the process and as claims to or justifications of membership in the
social world of other quartermasters. . . .
. . . .
It is clear that when quartermasters report bearings, assign landmarks, or ask
for data, they are not just constructing position fixes; they are also constructing social
relationships.  And the fact that their respective responsibilities are so well specified
does not eliminate the possibility of loading social messages into the communication
acts that make up the work.  In fact, the well-formed expectations about what
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constitutes competent verbal behavior in this setting may give the participants an
especially subtle means of communicating social messages.69
Hutchins characterizes this cognitive processing system as “distributed” or
“decomposed,” and he identifies a variety of benefits (and some costs)
associated with it.  By breaking down or “modularizing” cognitive tasks, it
controls the complexity of the overall problem.  It permits each individual to
focus only on a relatively limited set of data, making that person’s task more
tractable.  It facilitates the entry of novice practitioners into the system, by
giving them social and other material structures that constrain them in their
performance.  It mitigates the consequences of a failure in some part of the
system, so that the failure is not catastrophic.  And it facilitates the adaptation
of the system to change, particularly incremental or progressive change.70
One of Hutchins’s special interests lies in how the social construction of
cognition not only helps navigators solve problems, but also helps them to
innovate in circumstances not governed by standard protocols.  His
conclusion, that “[t]he very same processes that constitute the conduct of the
activity and that produce changes in the individual practitioners of navigation
also produce changes in the social, material, and conceptual aspects of the
setting,”  or that material changes in the navigation setting manifest71
themselves in changes to the details of navigation practice, is supported by an
example drawn from what he characterizes as the “cognitive ecology” of the
bridge that supports cultural innovation:  two members of the navigation72
team, the “plotter” and the “bearing recorder,” innovate “a new concept and
a shared lexical label for it (the ‘total’ in the modular form of the true-bearing
computation).”   It cannot be said on the basis of this observation that social73
structures of this (or any) sort are necessarily innovative or creative, but the
finding does encourage paying attention to the social and cultural conditions
that constrain and produce innovation, rather than solely to mental processes
of one sort or another.
These results are at least suggestive in relatively well-defined problem-
solving contexts, where the material structures involved are hierarchical and
roles are clear.  Hutchins, however, intends to draw a lesson that does not
depend on the precise material conditions that he found in the Navy–that
formal models of human cognition that are based exclusively on individual
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Id. at 360.
75. See id. at 359-72.
symbol-processing are necessarily and inherently flawed,  because they74
necessarily omit the fact that, “in the wild,” cognitive processing involves
humans acting upon symbols, rather than the symbols alone, in themselves.75
As human agency is inextricably bound up with social and cultural conditions,
cognition becomes a sociocultural system, rather than a function of an
individual symbol processor.
I take two points from Hutchins’s research, even assuming that his and
others’ work on distributed and embodied cognition is still in its early stages.
The first is the affinity between Hutchins’s diagnosis of the fundamental
mismatch between classic models of cognitive processing, and his notion of
“embodied” cognition, on the one hand, and my suggestion above that the law
may err by channeling group activity into certain specified forms, on the other
hand.  The second is that if Hutchins is correct regarding cognition as a
sociocultural system, the material conditions of informal groups, like those of
the more formal social structures that Hutchins observed, are likely to
participate in a “cognitive ecology” of adaptive and innovative practice.  The
characteristics of those practices are likely to be highly context-specific and
therefore demand careful attention.  By the same token, it would be unwise for
law and policy to overlook their possible benefits.
C.  Constructive Groups
A third and final example of the virtues of informed groups comes from
the Science, Technology, and Society (STS) literature, which in broad terms
analyzes technology and material culture as expressions of various social and
normative commitments, rather than as “inevitable” products of material
progress, as the fruits of purposive and functional design, or as manifestations
of the true or authentic character of things.  Technology is cultural, it has
meaning, and that meaning is constituted by social and cultural forms, that is,
by groups.  We define the things we make, have, and use.  
An example of this approach, and one that relies particularly clearly on
informal groups, is the Social Construction of Technology, or SCOT, theory
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77. Pinch & Bijker, supra note 76, at 30; see also BIJKER, supra note 76, at 45-53
(describing the characteristics of groups).
78. See Pinch & Bijker, supra note 76, at 30-39.
79. BIJKER, supra note 76, at 282.
of Wiebe Bijker and his colleagues.   Bijker describes the meaning of a given76
technological artifact as a function of various social groups, and a
technological frame. 
The phrase [“social group”] is used to denote institutions and organizations (such as
the military or some specific industrial company), as well as organized or unorganized
groups of individuals.  The key requirement is that all members of a certain social
group share the same set of meanings, attached to a specific artifact.77
The group exists both for group members, that is, people aware of being part
of a group, and for observers, who reconstruct the existence of the group.
(Groups may, but need not, consist of user populations.)  Artifacts are
introduced with, or develop, interpretive flexibility.  Various groups develop
different meanings via their interactions with it and with each other.  Via an
interative process, a dominant or stable meaning emerges, which Bijker calls
its “technological frame.”    “Ongoing interactions with an artifact, within78
and between relevant social groups, results in the creation of a technological
frame that bounds the attributions of meanings by relevant social groups.”79
That frame hardens the artifact in a stable network of practices, theories, and
institutions.  The technological frame of the artifact, in turn, defines the
boundaries of the group.  
Bijker illustrates this process with descriptive histories of the bicycle,
and of the plastic known as Bakelite:  
A new technological frame is formed, shared by several social groups that until then
could be represented by separate frames.  The formation of the Bakelite frame through
the enrollment of automotive engineers and radio amateurs is an example.  Bakelite
had an increasingly fixed meaning when it was used in the negotiations between
employees of the General Bakelite Corporation and the engineers of the automobile,
radio, and chemical instrument manufacturing industries.  The artifact Bakelite thus
functioned at the same time as an element in [the inventor] Baekeland’s micropolitics
of power and as a boundary artifact in the emerging semiotic power structure of the
new Bakelite technological frame.  We might say that Bakelite was a form of
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currency, allowing the negotiation of new relationships between previously unrelated
social groups.  The boundary artifact Bakelite helped to link, in an almost physical
sense, the different social groups into one new semiotic structure.80
As a boundary, the artifact helps to define the group itself.  Group insiders
tend to view the artifact as unambiguous and constraining, but also as capable
of differentiation, and therefore highly enabling.  Outsiders tend to look at the
artifact as monolithic, with a “take-it-or-leave-it” character.  Making the “take
it” choice means passage to the inside, a fact that links the sociocultural
evolution described by SCOT to power dynamics and strategic behavior.   In81
a real sense, the technological frame, connected to a social group, determines
what the thing “is,” and the character of the thing in turn helps to determine
the shape and power of social groups.
I introduce Bijker, as I have introduced Cover and Hutchins, not to make
a strong claim regarding the truth of these conclusions, or any one of them.
I introduce them to illustrate how the notion of the informal group has been
deployed as an analytic tool, with some explanatory power, in a variety of
contexts.  In none of these theories is the group introduced to serve a
functional role; rather, each of them identifies the existence of the group and
articulates ways in which the concept contributes to some broader
understanding of social welfare.  That is, we do not know in advance what or
how any particular group will develop or the particular good or goal that it
might achieve.  In all three contexts summarized above, groups happen, and
we can draw out their benefits after the fact.  Those contexts are themselves
intriguing for purposes of drawing parallels to legal analysis; SCOT theory is
useful, for example, in understanding the normative power of the “substantial
noninfringing use” doctrine that protects manufacturers of the VCR from
secondary liability for copyright infringement.82
III.  GROUPS IN THE LAW
The good of groups should not be limited to the contexts described in
Part II.  This Part advances the argument one final step.  If it is the case that
informal groups may do good things, but we cannot specify in advance what
those things are (if we could, then we would not have much use for the group
concept, and we could focus on those things themselves), perhaps law and
policy should look for ways to promote the informal group as such.
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heterogenous counterparts in accomplishing specific tasks.  See Marvin E. Shaw, A Note
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PSYCH. 448 (1960).  But see Jeanne Longley & Dean G. Pruitt, Groupthink:  A Critique of
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85. Cf. OSTROM, supra note 35, at 12-21 (outlining conditions for successful commons
management in structural terms).
86. See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 1, at 365-67.
There are at least two ways to promote the informal group.  One is to do
so directly, by declaring that some collective “is” or “is not” a group.  This is
the classical legal approach: A collective is a “city,” or a “corporation,” or a
“jury,” or a “family,” because the collective satisfies certain formal
conditions.   This is straightforward goal-oriented regulation; one might83
characterize it as a way for policy to secure the benefits of tightly integrated
groups, and to mitigate their negative effects.   A second way is indirect, by84
focusing on the material or structural conditions that support the formation
and evolution of more loosely integrated groups, whose internal workings are
left largely beyond the reach of the law.   The distinction tracks what one85
recent article characterizes as the emergence of a “governance” paradigm for
law and policy.   The policy challenge is not to divide the world into “public”86
and “private” (or “government” and “market”) domains, or “social” and
“private” spheres.  Instead, the challenge is to understand the benefits of
blending those traditionally distinct categories. 
Identifying these material conditions means that I need to press a little
harder on the core concept.  What, precisely, is this loosely integrated,
informal group?  If informal groups as such have a potentially significant role
in creating law and other social and technical goods, then it is important both
to be able to recognize them, and to know when and how they are likely to
arise.  In both senses, law and policy can exercise an important role in
influencing the creation of informal groups, and in sustaining them.
As I use the term, “informal group” is a broad and inclusive concept,
embracing everything from quilting clubs to college alumni populations.  It is
broader and more inclusive than “team,” “social network,” or “community”–
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the last term being of special interest both in the context of early cyberspace
utopianism  and in the context of research on social norms as governance87
structures.   Informal groups may or may not be close-knit “communities”;88
they may, in fact, be diverse, decentralized, and populated by people who are,
for many purposes, acting independently of one another.  (To some extent, that
description tracks the concept of the social network, though I avoid that term
largely because I am not borrowing network theory as an analytic tool.)   A89
group is bounded in some way, culturally, socially, or materially–it may be
bounded by geography, territory, or other place; by discipline or practice; by
membership, identity or interest, among other things–but that boundedness is
neither fixed nor firm.   Informal groups, as I conceive them, are not limited90
to small groups or to groups that are sanctioned or recognized by formal but
non-legal rules.  As I argued above,  salience itself may serve to enforce a91
stable boundedness that identifies a group.
A.  Finding Groups in the Law
Groups are, of course, partly an express target and partly an implicit by-
product of conventional legal regulation.  For examples, I return to the law and
policy of Internet technology.  My emphasis on borders and boundedness
echoes early debates in the cyberspace law literature regarding when and
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95. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
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97. See Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
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whether “cyberspace” should be characterized as an independent legal
jurisdiction.  To what extent should online activity identify its participants as
members of a distinct normative group?  In doctrinal terms, the debate has
been manifested in decisions applying national norms for personal
jurisdiction.  The traditions of the field dictate that the question be framed as
one of jurisdiction to adjudicate the interests of an individual defendant, but,
as Paul Berman points out, the personal jurisdiction construct may be re-
conceptualized in terms of the authority of competing sovereigns, i.e.,
informal groups: “[T]he story of jurisdiction is a story of social space and
community definition[, in which] the very ideas of space and community are
themselves narrative constructions that are always contested.”   92
Group identity and affiliation raise questions of insider and outsider
status–Is a person genuinely part of the group?  Is that person entitled to come
in, or to be here?–that track other doctrinal issues.  Cases addressing
unauthorized use of computer network resources, whether based on “trespass
to chattels” doctrine,  the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,  or “clickwrap”93 94
and related contract claims,  are determined in part by analysis of individual95
interests, but also by policy judgments regarding the scope and value of claims
to authentic in-group status.  The question in each case is the extent to which
the owners and operators of some computer network are entitled to determine
for themselves the scope and content of the group that comprises the network.
eBay gets to determine who “is” eBay, for example;  the terms of the open96
source software license determine the scale and the character of the open
source software community.   Governance of the group raises the question of97
dynamism.  How are the evolutionary processes of the group to be governed?
Doctrinally, can the proprietors of a “group” defined by license (such as a
community of software users) and/or software (such as an online game
environment) create a baseline for group dynamics that mandates the
perpetuation of the group (as in the case of the open source software license)
or that excludes that right to reverse engineer the software platform itself–that
is, to evolve the group?
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100. Crawford, supra note 30.
101. See John Alan Farmer, Note, The Specter of Crypto-Anarchy: Regulating
Anonymity-Protecting Peer-to-Peer Networks, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 725 (2003). 
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Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000).
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Daniel Solove calls this the “aggregation” problem.  Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation:
Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1184-95 (2002).  Lior
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(arguing that privacy is a function of the connectedness of the group, i.e., the likelihood that
information about you is likely to become known within, and beyond, some group).    In either
case, privacy depends how we conceptualize group context.   
104. See generally Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the
Public Sphere, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (2005); McGowan, Social Friction, supra note 52.
105. I use the label “corporate law” to describe work on institutions designed to support
production of goods and services.  See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 43; Margaret Chon, New Wine
Bursting From Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75
OR. L. REV. 257 (1996); Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 48.  While the Internet has
demonstrated that there are viable alternatives to the firm in coordinating production of goods,
those alternatives need not (and probably should not) be characterized solely in terms of
Cases involving online anonymity and defamation similarly query the
legitimacy of claims of group affiliation.  To what extent does membership in
a group require disclosure of individual identity–either inside or outside the
group?   Relatedly, how should reputation, which is always a group question98
of some sort, be managed online?   Investigations of online identity may be99
characterized, therefore, as investigations of groups themselves.  Susan
Crawford sums up the question with the phrase, “Who’s in charge of who I
am?”   However desirable we think anonymity and pseudonymity are in the100
real world, to what extent should that sense extend online?  To what extent
should anonymity and pseudonymity be enabled by law and technology?101
If the ability to deceive regarding your identity is a valuable characteristic of
some groups, how do we balance that interest against legitimate interests in
protecting reputation, both within those groups, and outside them?   102
Similar exercises, to constitute doctrinal questions as inquiries into
informal groups, might be pursued in the context of privacy law,  intellectual103
property and speech law,  and corporate law.   In the balance of this Part,104 105
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COMMUNICATE 11-14 (1997), in which he relates information spaces, stories, and things in
medieval architecture, nineteenth-century literature, and software interfaces. 
108. The material in this Subpart is drawn in part from Michael J. Madison, Law as
Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
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however, I turn to tools that law may use to manipulate the material conditions
that nurture informal groups and, in turn, to press on the doctrinal questions
just reviewed.  If informal groups are defined by their loosely bounded
character, and salience enhances a sense of boundedness, then law and policy
should seek out ways to enhance that salience.  Some recent research in
organizational behavior suggests, in fact, that using indirect tactics to heighten
the salience of various material features of the social environment is likely to
enhance productive informal group dynamics, and that direct or “controlling”
regulation of the group is likely to limit the effectiveness of the group.106
Below, I describe three such tools. 
B.  Law and The Future of Groups
In Part II, I described three contexts in which theorists posit the good that
groups might do, contexts that might be reduced, crudely, to stories (Cover’s
group-dependent nomos), places (Hutchins’s navigation bridges), and things
(Bijker’s material artifacts).  Drawing out the salience of informal groups,
then, might take at least these three forms: orienting activity toward or around
things, reinforcing a sense of place, and heightening the boundary
characteristics of relevant narratives.   In the discussion that follows, I draw107
liberally on my earlier work.
1.  On Things   108
Groups both create and depend on things.  As Wendy Gordon has noted,
“Shareable goods are a traditional source of binding groups together: not only
standard ‘public goods’ such as highways and defense, but also folk tales, art,
songs, and symphonies.”   Beth Noveck observes that online groups depend109
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How do things come to embody meaning?  In much anthropological and sociological
writings, things have mainly been considered in two ways: either as commodities or as
gifts.  Correspondingly, people’s relationships to things and to other people seem to
fall in two broad categories, often regarded as mutually exclusive: either as impersonal,
economic or market relationships with strangers, or as personal gift relationships with
intimates, friends or relatives.  The “social life of things”, however, is more varied.
Aafke Komter, Heirlooms, Nikes and Bribes: Towards a Sociology of Things, 35 SOC. 59
(2001).
114. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE  L.J.
549, 609-11 (2001) (recommending property forms that create incentives for the sorts of
cooperation that occur within strong communities); Peñalver, supra note 13. 
on stable representations of group members and group-related objects.110
Property rights, as things, reify relationships between and among people.
In each of these senses, groups coalesce around things.  These may be
physical, tangible things.  They may be intangible or virtual things.  Thomas
Schelling described the concept of “focal points,” now sometimes referred to
as “Schelling points,” to describe objects or sites around which individuals
coordinated their activities.   STS scholars refer to “affordances” of objects111
in the physical world to denote the role that objects play in shaping how
individuals behave and how group dynamics evolve.   Customs, traditions,112
patterns, and practices of reproduction, modification, and use develop and
intersect via connections to things.   Communications channels develop to113
discuss, respond to, and simply to use things.  Things embody information that
communities and groups develop, deposit, and extract.   Via their very shape114
and via their classification in law or otherwise, things exercise authority.
Social software is a thing.  An open source software program is a thing.  An
open source license is a thing.  A weblog is a thing; a wiki is a thing; a
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network is a thing.  We recognize them as things, think of them as things, and
speak of them as things.  
Patents, for example, are things that are entirely legal creations, and
though they are not “social software,” patents coordinate systems of activity,
and do so quite explicitly, in much the way that social software does in other
domains.   Even more clearly, the characteristics of the open source115
computer program and the open source software license, or the Creative
Commons license and the Creative Commons-licensed work, so long as they
are suitably salient, are hubs for groups of various sorts.   116
If things have a potentially authoritative role in constituting groups, law
and policy can work on enhancing their salience and stability.  Things occupy
their social role via their presence and relative permanence, but things are not
simply given.  They are created, and they evolve.  Law has quite an elaborate
set of mechanisms that it uses to create and manage “thing-ness.”  Sometimes
the law reinforces thing-ness, by increasing the hard-edges of copyrights and
patents, or software licenses that coordinate group activity, for example.
Sometimes the law disables or moderates it, by loosening those edges with
exceptions and limitations.  The STS tradition in which Bijker is writing,
which is especially attentive to changes in things over time, would recommend
situating thing-ness by referring to practices (“how things are used”), and that
approach is well-represented in law.  But law also manages thing-ness by
referring to economics (“the welfare effects of things”), in bargains and
contracting (via clickwrap agreements, the parties agree on what a “thing”
“is”), to design (“it’s just the way things are”), or to the essential properties
of the object (“the natural order of things”).  The point here is that the law has
regulatory options.
2.  On Places117
Groups do not depend solely on things; groups also depend on place, or
at least on a sense of place.  Sociologists and geographers are acutely aware
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[I]t is no longer possible to understand “place” in static terms or from any singular
vantage point. As cultural geographers have shown, places are not sources of
stability–the source of essential or integrated identities–around which boundaries can
be drawn, but are particular constellations of historical relations articulated at a
particular locus.
Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to Law and
Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 791 (1995).
121. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES
of the role of place and its cousin, space, in ordering activities of groups.118
Individuals want and need to know where they are, and where others are, in
order to manage various communicative practices.   This relationship flows119
in the opposite direction as well.  Critical geographers point out that places
derive their character from the social practices situated there.    Place and120
space structure social relationships, and are structured by them.
In the physical world, Jane Jacobs, Lewis Mumford, and others pointed
out long ago the extent to which we take space and place for granted, and the
extent to which we can manage our environment to produce and support
different kinds of social interaction.  The physical affordances of place and
space can enliven and stimulate a group, or deaden it.   Architects and121
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123. KEVIN LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY 2, 8-13 (1960).
124. Id. at 92.
125. Id. at 16, 46-49.
126. Id. at 9. 
127. See id. at 108-10.
128. See generally Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003). 
planners can do this through design; law, too, can do it by rewarding features
of the physical environment that signal the presence of bounded places.   The122
urban planner Kevin Lynch demonstrated this in The Image of the City,123
concluding that inhabitants of a city relied on mental “readings” of their cities,
focusing on landmarks and boundaries: “[I]f the environment is visibly
organized and sharply identified, then the citizen can inform it with his own
meanings and connections.  Then it will become a true place, remarkable and
unmistakable.”   The organization and distinction derived from an inventory124
of features and boundaries that included open space, contrasts–paths, edges,
nodes, landmarks, and distinct districts–and a sense of motion.   The degree125
to which these features were present is a measure of the “imageability” of the
environment, defined as “that quality in a physical object which gives it a high
probability of evoking a strong image in any given observer.  It is that shape,
color, or arrangement which facilitates the making of vividly identified,
powerfully structured, highly useful mental images of the environment.”126
An “imageable” city conveys a coherent mental map to its inhabitants.   In127
short, place is not simply a matter of where you are.  Place is a cognitive
construct.
There is no reason to think that a different proposition applies in virtual
or online contexts, particularly given the extent to which our colloquial sense
of those environments is framed by metaphors of place and space.   The128
environmental heterogeneity and salience that Jacobs and Mumford praised
can be developed online as well.   One way to do that is through interface
design, such that the apparent “physical” features of the online setting are
sufficiently stable to signify “place” to the individuals who “go” and “stay”
there.  Law offers a complementary set of tools, which can be used to reward
online “imageability.”  Boundaries, borders, and connections in computer
networks may be omnipresent as a technical matter, but hidden, for all intents
and purposes, from the perspective of those who use those networks.  Law and
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policy may intervene to promote the salience of those boundaries and borders
in a variety of doctrinal settings.  Purported acceptances of offers of clickwrap
agreements and “terms of use” may be deemed ineffective if the offers were
not sufficiently visible; “technological protection measures” that trigger
application of the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act may be deemed “ineffective” if the user is not sufficiently
warned of their existence; the doctrine of “trespass to chattels” may not be
invoked by the owner of an online data resource unless the boundary that the
defendant has crossed is marked in some clear, human-readable way.   The129
law has not, generally, moved in this direction, but it is clear that doctrinal
tools exist to implement the policy choice.
3.  On Stories130
The conventional account defines groups by their goals.  We encourage
individuals to do things in groups when we like what groups do; we
discourage individuals from participating in groups when we do not like what
groups do.  At the far edges of the normative spectrum, this is inescapable.  A
terrorist cell is a group of a sort that almost anyone would agree has no
defensible normative basis.   A nuclear family or a household is the sort of131
group that almost anyone would agree has a nearly impeccable moral
pedigree.   In the vast middle, however, lies the unexplored normative132
territory of groups.  To help us make sense of this territory, law and policy
may need yet another set of tools, this one drawn from literature.  We can
succeed in differentiating good groups from evil groups, and better groups
from worse groups, in part, by explaining, exploring, and contrasting the
narratives that can be constructed out of them.   Social software shows how133
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groups themselves can propose and evolve their own narratives.  Virtual
worlds technology consists, at one level, of nothing but story creation.
We might, alternatively, use narrative techniques to construct stories as
observers.  Informal groups are social structures for communicating.  They are
social structures that involve sharing things–sharing identities, sharing
information, sharing tangible stuff.  The sharing may be the point, or the
sharing may be a by-product.  But sharing of one sort or another is involved.
My examples from social software simply make the character of those sharing
arrangements more explicit than they often are.  Is sharing a good thing?
That, then, is the difficult question, and my suggestion is that constructing
persuasive narratives–something that the law can do–will help us to answer
that question.
Where do we find these narratives, or how do we construct them?  In a
recent article on fair use in copyright law, I went through an analysis of
economic, sociological, and anthropological literature on this point, and came
to the tentative conclusion that patterns of social behavior may be oriented
around particular disciplines or practices, such as journalism, or scholarship.
Disciplines come with sets of rules, soft rules, certainly, but rules that are
recognized both inside and outside the discipline, and which police the
borders of the discipline and activity by its members.  Professional disciplines
are not the only sources of rules.  Rules can be borrowed from outside
contexts, or they can emerge from sustained interaction among individuals.
They may be formal; they may consist of social norms; and/or they may
consist of conventions or regularities in social behavior.  My earlier work
characterized these structures as “patterns,” though one could borrow the
phrase “practices” just as easily.134
These “rules of the game,” so to speak, constitute narratives in
themselves.  If we find them, the law may conclude that it should privilege
them.  In the context of fair use, my claim is that the law has done just that,
and that it is right that it should do so.  Informal groups based on social
practices are, I argue, inclined to be innovative and creative.   The law need135
not go that far.  Narratives of this sort carry the kind of persuasive potential
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that we see throughout the law.  A group sustained by a persuasive narrative
may deserve greater deference in law and policy than a group without one.
We see this, for example, in debates over the scope of secondary liability for
copyright infringement.  Twenty years ago, when the VCR was under
challenge, “time-shifting” by VCR users created a narrative that ultimately
persuaded the Supreme Court that sales of the VCR should not trigger
liability.  Defenders of contemporary P2P file-sharing networks have yet to
develop a comparably persuasive narrative.136
Patent law offers another striking example of the development and
application of a group narrative.  Scholars looking at the sociology of science
have recognized, anecdotally, that the optimal organization of scientific
research consists of independent communities of researchers working with
knowledge of one another’s activities.   Welfare costs from duplicative137
research are more than offset by correction of mistakes, confirmation of
research results, and differential analyses of common data, leading to better
syntheses.   Pure “science,” in turn, receives special dispensations in138
intellectual property law: “Laws of nature” (the objects of basic scientific
research) are unpatentable; until recently, academic practitioners of patented
technology could look to an “experimental use” exemption from liability for
patent infringement.  The fact that the experimental use exception appears to
have been cut back dramatically, if not eliminated entirely, suggests the
weakening of the “basic science” narrative on which academic scientists have
long relied.   139
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What role can law and policy play here, besides responding to these sorts
of internal narratives?  Disciplinary practices and normative communities are
not the only sources of narrative.  Advocates develop narratives to help their
clients; policymakers develop narratives to advance agendas.  The flexibility
of cyberspace technology suggests that we can design our own group
narratives as we use the technology to design groups themselves.   This may140
be the ultimate virtue of social software: It allows its participants to create
their own stories.  The role of law, then, is to judge the extent to which it
should allow this to happen.   Social software may teach, then, that law does141
not need to discriminate between “good” groups and “bad” groups.  Rather,
whatever its regulatory goals may be, the law needs to develop tools to
manage the development, maintenance, and evolution of rule structures that
define groups themselves.
CONCLUSION
Internet and related communications technologies support an emerging
environment of what I call “social software.”  “Social software” supports the
creation and persistence of informal, dynamic groups of people, and it makes
those groups visible and salient to a larger degree than they have been before.
That salience should prompt law and policy to rethink historic skepticism of
informal collectives, particularly in light of suggestions that the loose
constraints that define informal groups may enable them to do a lot of good.
Amid my praise for the virtues of the informal group, in this Conclusion
I hedge my bets.  Much of this topic remains for further exploration, within
law as well as within economics, sociology, and computer science itself.    My
caution stems from several sources.  One is the nagging sense that we do not
know enough about where groups come from and how they operate to entrust
them with important chunks of public policy.  Law and policy flirted with
sociology and the notion of groups during the middle of the twentieth
century.   Over a period of decades it largely abandoned that discipline in142
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favor of individualism and, ultimately, a growing reliance on neo-classical
economics.  If law is going to borrow from the social sciences, the question
is which ones to choose?  The economics paradigm has well-known
weaknesses, but it is not clear that we know enough to turn away from it
entirely.143
Alongside that descriptive concern is this normative one: Law’s
skepticism of informal groups may be well-founded, since, for purposes of the
law, informal groups may create more problems than they solve.  At the
abstract level, if much of my argument may be reduced to the point that public
policy should give informal groups broad discretion to organize and manage
their own affairs, where and how do we locate limits for that discretion?
Antitrust law is virtually the only resource that we currently have at our
disposal, particularly as it deals with anti-competitive implications of
technical standards and standard-setting organizations, and antitrust law is
having a very difficult time with this sort of question.   At the concrete level,144
how does a lawyer counsel a client regarding the benefits and hazards of
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dealing with informal groups?  Consider a small company that is considering
whether to install a computer program developed and maintained by an
informal open source “community” and licensed under an open source
software license.  How does that company evaluate the commercial risks that
may accompany using that program?  With a firm as licensor, the lawyer can
track its organizational structure and assess possible sources of liability and
recovery.  In the open source context, this problem is not insuperable, but it
is considerably more complex, and both professional and economic incentives
tend to push organizational forms toward the simpler solution.  Prefer the
individual, and prefer the firm.
That conclusion may offer a basis for caution in locating the future of the
group in the law, but that caution does not take away from the core of my
argument.  Autonomy, it might be said, is overrated: The liberating potential
of the personal computer is, in many respects, unfulfilled. In the home,
computers are used as high-tech telephones and small-scale music studios.
We email as much as we talk on the phone.  We burn CDs and DVDs as much
as we go to concerts or movie theaters.  We surf the Web instead of going to
the library and visit chat rooms instead of (or even inside of) the local coffee
shop.  In the workplace, today’s low-level programming cube-farmers have
little more “autonomy” than the human “computers” of fifty years ago.  At an
individual level, whether we are using computing technology to produce, or
consume, or reuse, people are still “computers”; only the scale and distribution
of processing power has changed.  It is only something of a rhetorical
overstatement to say that the “autonomy” granted by modern digital
computing isolates and diminishes us at least as much as, if not more than, it
brings forth our potential.  Perhaps, then, to ask about computers and
“autonomy,” is, at least in traditional terms, to ask the wrong
question. Sometimes we should look at the “I.”  But much of the time, we
should be looking at the “we.”
